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Consciousness Explained by Daniel C. Dennett
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Consciousness Explained

by Daniel C. Dennett

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1,350192,725 (3.98)18
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Penguin Books Ltd (1993), Paperback

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don't get me wrong, dennett is a brilliant philosopher. however, this book is more aptly titled, 'Consciousness Can Be Explained'. dennett has provide a wonderful precis to a philosophy of mind, but falls short insofar as he has only illustrated the subjunctive stance that consciousness is explainable. what the explanation is is another issue entirely. ( )
  lanewilkinson | Dec 4, 2009 |
Dennett's ideas are interesting, and even fascinating at times. Unfortunately, his writing becomes garrulous and difficult to comprehend.

Maybe I need a better grounding in, and a wider exposure to, metaphysics before trying to finish this book. Or maybe metaphysics isn't something I want to really explore.

Appropriately, though, Dennett addresses Descartes' "theater of the mind" early in the book, and frames his thesis as a contest between cartesian dualism and materialism.

Alper's The God Part of the Brain explores some of the same philosophical questions, but is written more accessibly. Dennett's work on consciousness is a more generalized approach to the nature of human perception and, as such, is abstract in the extreme--not to mention highly technical. ( )
  stringplucker | Oct 18, 2009 |
Daniel Dennett shows us why we're stuff doing stuff. ( )
  phrontist | Jul 10, 2009 |
Consciousness exists in a very different way from what we're used to think; it's not a substance, neither a smaller person in our brain who run all the rest.
Dennett tells us that it's more like a software (some knowledge in informatics will help): less real than mere matter, more concrete than an idea.
Dennett perspective is intelligent and sound. He understands that our doubt on the matter comes from our fear that dispelling consciousness will give away our ideas of responsability and moral behaviour. There's no need for that. (He dedicated one more book on the argument, 'Freedom evolves', but here it is a short explanation -> http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/incpages...
Read ”Some observations on the psychology of thinking about free will”, 2007)
It could take more than one lecture to grasp completely all the argumentations and the implications which contrast with our common sense. Though, all the effort pays well.
Some things may have been explained better, but in the end Dennett's perspective is crystal clear.
Philosophy at its best. ( )
  Ramirez | Jun 8, 2009 |
(posted on my blog: http://davenichols.net/consciousness-...)

I wish I had read this book many years ago, though after having read the book, I have to question whether my conscious self illusion had developed enough to know how handle the arguments Dr. Dennett presents. From the opening chapters, this book is a candy store for thinkers. Make no mistake, it is deep and will require concentration from most any reader. The rewards, like any good read, are worth the effort as Dennett makes a profound and intensely engaging argument about his philosophy of mind, consciousness, and self. He makes extensive use of the idea of Virtual Machines, software, and AI-style capabilities in building his model of mind.

Dennett opens up in Part 1 with an exploration of the groundwork for his theory, offering the reader some soft (but quickly advancing) concepts of hallucinations, 'mind stuff', and phenomenology (which he abstracts into heterophenomenology for use later). This section skirts some of the more basic philosophical arguments (of which there are general if not specific agreements) in favor of offering challenges to intuition and 'seems to be' type thinking.

In Part II, he breaks down his theory of Multiple Drafts as a more reasonable (and often, direct affront to) the traditional Cartesian Theater arguments. To put this simply, Dennett's theory argues against the firm existence of a Central Meaner (audience in the theater, ultimate decider, aka soul or top brain dog) while presenting his Multiple Drafts idea. He supposes that consciousness arises, not due to the presense of a specific observer/decider, but instead as the reflective consequence of multiple contributions to the mental state. These 'drafts', as he refers to them, are temporary versions of introspective narrative which are only true until they get edited (and these edits take place in a decentralized manner based on many factors). Because the information used to develop the self-narration comes from numerous sources whose functional-chains are often specialized and multifaceted, and because one cannot determine between two types of rewriting (Orwellian, which involves revisionist history, or Stalinesque, which includes more real-time 'made-up' explanations treated as if factual), the Multiple Drafts theory seems to satisfy these issues, as well as solve many of the problems of the tangibility and determinism found in the alternative theories.

The final Part of the book explores the numerous objections likely thrown up at this theory, and offers extended discussion of why Multiple Drafts both fits the evidence and offers the scientific advantage of being testable and falsifiable. Using many thought exercises and scientific studies of brain-damaged or abnormally-acting people, Dennett argues that the idea of quale (a rival explanation in the Cartesian Theater model) doesn't fit the evidence, is self-contradictory, and cannot be reduced in a meaningful and testable manner.

The most fascinating discussion in Explained is Dennett's thoughts on the creation and indoctrination of consciousness. His theory is basically the following: early creatures gained advantage by taking traditional basic instincts and abilities (like fight-or-flight, verticle symmetry detection, etc) and making them more active and available. Rather than only being called for under extreme conditions (or more specifically, only available when the instinct itself notices stimuli it is both equiped to notice and for which it 'cares'), an 'always-on' mentality allowed greater observation and more information collection. This lead to stronger, more efficient means of distributing observation-based data and acting upon instructions that are more likely to be advantageous. Primates in particular got especially good at saccade (visual jumpiness that allows the eye to observe more points in its line-of-sight, thereby, collecting more data), which likely increased our ability to protect ourselves and to find food. Shortcuts were created in the brain at this point which began to lay the foundation architecture for the language to come later.

Early pre-language hominids likely used some audio mechanism to communicate very basic information in a one-directional sort of way. 'I'm looking for food' probably elicited no direct response, though it would have been a data point considered by anyone in earshot. At some point, this stopped being simply one-way, and a question/answer process evolved. 'I'm looking for food' might lead to 'I have a lot of food'. The asker, however, was likely unable to ask and then answer himself, leaving an efficiency gap to be filled. Later, a sole homo sapien likely started the process with a question, but no one else was around to answer. However, a surprising thing happened: he answered himself. 'I'm looking for food' might have been answered by his own voice (or perhaps internally) with 'Try the bush by the big rock.' Not consciously aware of self-talking (as we would define it), but in a 'I just asked about X' and 'I received an answer about X'.

While the process was inefficient, having had to be formulated, passed out the vocal chords and mouth, and received back in the ear and reprocessed, the invaluable addition of consulting one's self quickly became an advantageous Big Trick (Dennett's idea that social evolution can take place very quickly if a specific action or ability could be both possible due to genetics and available to learn from others who themselves would have developed or learned the Trick). From this point on, humans developed an efficiency we now call an inner monologue (although Dennett is careful to say that this is not just a textual 'spoken' monologue, but instead a multi-faceted creation from multiple heterogeneous contributors) which didn't require (but in many of us, still is exhibited as) vocally 'talking to ourselves'.

From this point on, the reader can infer that consciousness came about, not through a guided Observer or Meaner, but through the chaotic, pandemoniac contributions of various brain-functions and sub-functions. Consciousness is more of a bucket of interaction where subroutines can pay attention to both hardwired areas of interest (pain receptors looking for pain in the hands, for example) but also have the ability to contribute to areas of temporary interest (those same pain receptors might offer a concept of pain to the bucket in response to the information that a fire is near before a narrative leading to a hand being placed in the fire can be acted upon).

Dennett also contends that consciousness may well be taught to children (as a meme set) rather than inherited in a traditional genetically-driven manner, and consciousness is only made possible by our ability to use and understand language (at least the sort of consciousness as humans know it to be). 'Words do things with us' he titled one chapter. Dennett does argue that we have to be genetically predisposed to be able to be conscious, but that consciousness itself is only one possible arrangement of the various brain functions available to a human. One quote he uses really boils this down in a way that is both enlightening and haunting, in the words of Helen Keller:

"Before my teacher came to me, I did not know that I am. I lived in a world that was a no-world. I cannot hope to describe adequately that unconscious time of nothingness...Since I had no power of thought, I did not compare one mental state with another.'

This review vastly oversimplifies Dennett's discussion and leaves out dozens of key points and sub-elements which make this book a very deep and rewarding read. Highly, highly recommended for the very curious mind, but I'd advise taking this book to a quiet room for a few days and really allowing yourself to disengage some of those constantly vigilant 'demons' of expectationalism and open up your mind (and self) to ideas you may never have dreamed could be true. Believe Dennett or not on these theories, this book will make you think deep and carefully reconsider many things you took as given in your own head. Five stars. ( )
  IslandDave | May 7, 2009 |
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'Het is een genot om deze man re lezen en van hem te leren.' PIET VROON - D± GROENE AMSTERDAMMER
Door de opkomst van kunstmatige intelligentie is de belangstelling voor het bewustzijn weer toegenomen. Het bewustzijn is immers wat de mens van de computer onderscheidt. Danicl C. Denneet levert in Hel bewustzijn rerklaard een strijdbare en vernieuwende bijdrage aan de discussie over wat het bewustzijn eigenlijk is, liij vat het bewustzijn op als een zichzelf organiserend stelsel van regels waaraan ons brein is onderworpen.
'Niet alleen Dennetts betoog, maar ook de wijze waarop hij het voert,
verdient met aandacht te worden gevolgd.'
JAAP VAN HEERDEN - VRIJ NEDERLAND ISBN
'Zijn opus magnum. De verschillende draden van zijn werk komen hier bijeen.' NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR DE PSYCHOLÜGLE

De auteur, hoogleraar aan het Centrum voor Cognitieve Studies van de Tufts Universiteit in de USA, geeft in dit boek zijn ideeën weer over de organisatie van het bewustzijn. Het boek is een bijdrage aan de discussie over het bewustzijn en bespreekt het bewustzijn vanuit zowel natuurwetenschappelijke als filosofische optiek. Teneinde deze dualistische aanpak te onderstrepen geeft hij twee bijlagen: één voor filosofen en één voor wetenschappers. Het boek heeft een notenapparaat, een uitgebreide biografie en een register. De afbeeldingen zijn in zwart-wit en geven een goede ondersteuning van de tekst. De kern van de hypothese over het bewustzijn is, dat de auteur het opvat als een zichzelf organiserend stelsel van regels, waaraan onze hersenen zijn onderworpen. Hoewel het boek, gezien de opmerkingen op de achterkaft, geschikt is voor zowel de vakman als de leek, lijkt het voor de leek toch veel te moeilijk, als het gaat om de interpretatie van achtergrondinformatie.

Amazon.com (ISBN 0316180661, Paperback)

Consciousness is notoriously difficult to explain. On one hand, there are facts about conscious experience--the way clarinets sound, the way lemonade tastes--that we know subjectively, from the inside. On the other hand, such facts are not readily accommodated in the objective world described by science. How, after all, could the reediness of clarinets or the tartness of lemonade be predicted in advance? Central to Daniel C. Dennett's attempt to resolve this dilemma is the "heterophenomenological" method, which treats reports of introspection nontraditionally--not as evidence to be used in explaining consciousness, but as data to be explained. Using this method, Dennett argues against the myth of the Cartesian theater--the idea that consciousness can be precisely located in space or in time. To replace the Cartesian theater, he introduces his own multiple drafts model of consciousness, in which the mind is a bubbling congeries of unsupervised parallel processing. Finally, Dennett tackles the conventional philosophical questions about consciousness, taking issue not only with the traditional answers but also with the traditional methodology by which they were reached.

Dennett's writing, while always serious, is never solemn; who would have thought that combining philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience could be such fun? Not every reader will be convinced that Dennett has succeeded in explaining consciousness; many will feel that his account fails to capture essential features of conscious experience. But none will want to deny that the attempt was well worth making. --Glenn Branch

(retrieved from Amazon Fri, 24 Apr 2009 07:57:56 -0400)

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